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MILAN STOJADINOVIĆ, THE CROAT QUESTION AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL POSITION OF YUGOSLAVIA, 1935–1939
Dragan BAKIĆ
Serbian Academy for Sciences and Arts, Institute for Balkan Studies, Knez Mihailova 35/IV, 
11000 Belgrade, Serbia
e-mail: dragan.bakic@bi.sanu.ac.rs
ABSTRACT
This paper analysis the policy of Milan Stojadinović, Prime Minister and Foreign 
Minister of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1935–1939) towards the Croat question, i.e. the 
passive resistance with which the Croat Peasant Party led by Vlatko Maček opposed 
the Belgrade government, struggling for an autonomous status of Croatia. Based on the 
private papers of Stojadinović and Prince Regent, Paul Karadjordjević, the reports of 
the well-informed and shrewd British Minister in Belgrade, Ronald Hugh Campbell, 
as well as the rich literature on the Serbo-Croat relations in the Kingdom, this article 
attempts to examine Stojadinović’s approach to the Croat problem. It is argued here that 
Stojadinović’s treatment of the Croat question was closely related to his foreign policy, 
especially towards Italy and Germany. 
Keywords: Milan Stojadinović, Yugoslavia, Croat question, foreign policy, 1935–1939
MILAN STOJADINOVIĆ, LA QUESTIONE CROATA E LA POSIZIONE 
INTERNAZIONALE DELLA JUGOSLAVIA, 1935–1939
SINTESI
L’articolo analizza la politica di Milan Stojadinović, primo ministro e ministro degli 
esteri del Regno di Jugoslavia (1935–1939), verso la cosiddetta questione croata; infatti, 
per conquistare un’ampia autonomia della Croazia il Partito contadino croato guidato da 
Vlatko Maček si opponeva al governo di Belgrado con una resistenza passiva. Sulla base 
dell’archivio privato di Stojadinović e del reggente della Jugoslavia, il principe Pavle 
Karadjordjević, e delle relazioni di Ronald Hugh Campbell, il ministro plenipotenziario 
britannico a Belgrado che era ben informato e scaltro, nonché di una ampia letteratura 
dedicata alle relazioni serbo-croate nel Regno, il saggio intende presentare l’approccio 
di Stojadinović verso il problema croato. Si intende dimostrare che il suo atteggiamento 
verso questa questione era strettamente legata alla sua politica estera, in particolare 
verso l’Italia e la Germania.
Parole chiave: Milan Stojadinović, Jugoslavia, questione croata, politica estera, 
1935–1939
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INTRODUCTION
There is a fair amount of literature covering the perennial Croat question in the interwar 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia (Čulinović, 1961; Boban, 1965a; Boban, 1974; Petranović, 1980; 
Dragnich, 1983; Banac, 1988; Djokić, 2007). Nevertheless, a full-blown study of the 
policy of Milan Stojadinovic, the Prime Minister of Yugoslavia in the latter half of the 
1930s, towards the Croat opposition is still lacking, despite a number of useful works 
(Stojkov, 1985; Trifković, 2012; Svirčević, 2012; Nadoveza, 2010). There is also a dearth 
of studies that attempt to assess Stojadinović’s premiership in its totality, or place it in the 
larger framework of interwar Yugoslavia and South-Eastern Europe ‒ and no biography 
of this important politician. This paper oﬀ ers an analysis of his policy towards the Croat 
opposition with special reference to international situation and foreign policy. It will 
closely examine Stojadinović’s twin-aims of ensuring the inviolability of Yugoslavia’s 
borders in the increasingly perilous European situation and the maintenance of the 
existing constitutional order threatened by Croat federalist and separatist aspirations. It 
will also look at the rupture between him and Prince Paul, the Regent of Yugoslavia, 
which brought about Stojadinović’s downfall, and discuss the extent to which it resulted 
from their diﬀ ering concepts as to how to proceed with the solution of the Croat problem. 
This paper argues that Stojadinović dealt with the Croat opposition in close correlation 
with his foreign policy in keeping with his appreciation that, at least on the tactical level, 
he would maintain the upper hand as long as his handling of external aﬀ airs cut the 
ground from under the feet of any attempt to internationalise the Croat question.
THE CROAT QUESTION, ITS ORIGINS AND INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS
To set the context for this study, one has to look back to the unsettled internal situation 
in Yugoslavia which was a permanent feature of that country since her creation on 1 
December 1918. As has been noted, the internal bickering was essentially “an issue of 
the Jacobin state versus the old Habsburg constitutional complexity of historic units.” 
(Trifković, 1992, 355). The Serbs had lived in their independent national and unitary state 
for decades before the First World War and saw no reason to change that in a new state 
which was predicated on the national unity of South Slavs (Serbs, Croats and Slovenes) 
expressed through slogans “one people with three names” or “the three tribes of the 
Yugoslav nation”. For them, the complex constitutional solutions smacked too much of the 
hated and dismantled Austria-Hungary and were not compatible with the notion of a strong 
and powerful state. In contrast, the Croats had been part of the multinational Habsburg 
monarchy for centuries and used to having their status arranged through negotiations and 
contracts such as that of 1868 concluded between them and the Hungarians (Nagodba). 
When Stjepan Radić, the charismatic leader of the Croatian Peasant Party (CPP) in which 
the vast majority of Croats closed their ranks, reached an agreement with Belgrade in 
1925 and entered the government, it appeared that Serbo-Croat diﬀ erences had been 
resolved. His death after the attempt on his life at the National Assembly made by a 
fellow-MP from the Serb Radical Party in June 1928 plunged Yugoslavia into dramatic 
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crisis. His successor, Vladimir – Vlatko Maček, ordered the CPP’s members of parliament 
to boycott that institution and, moreover, disputed the legitimacy of the Kingdom. Unable 
and not inclined to ﬁ nd a democratic solution to the crisis, King Aleksandar introduced 
his personal regime and proclaimed the ideology of integral Yugoslavism which was 
supposed to abolish all ethnic, religious and cultural-historical diﬀ erences. It was then 
that Yugoslavia became the oﬃ  cial name of the country instead of the Kingdom of Serbs, 
Croats and Slovenes. The King also banned the activities of the existing “tribal” political 
parties as relics of the past.
His experiment in statecraft remained futile. The entire country opposed the loss of 
civil liberties and the Croats were particularly embittered by what they saw as a violent 
suppression of their national identity. In 1927, the CPP had made a coalition pact with 
the Independent Democratic Party that rallied a number of Serbs living mostly in Croatia 
and Bosnia known as the Peasant Democratic Coalition. On 7 November 1932, this 
coalition signed an agreement, along with a representative of the right-wing Croatian 
Party of Right (Hrvatska Stranka Prava or frankovci). Breathing ﬁ re against Serbian 
hegemony, the Zagreb Points (Zagrebačke punktacije) called for the annulment of 
the octroyed Constitution of September 1931 and the return to the pre-constitutional 
situation of 1918 from which a negotiated settlement between the Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes would determine the future internal composition of the country. As for that 
composition, the resolution vaguely mentioned “the association of interests” based on the 
freely expressed will of the constituent units (Boban, 1971). This reﬂ ected the diversity 
of views between the signatories of the Zagreb Points and the consequent diﬃ  culties of 
formulating a more precise political programme. The author of the text, Ante Trumbić, 
the ﬁ rst Yugoslav Minister for Foreign Aﬀ airs (1919–1920) and now formally a member 
of the CPP, expounded that a prospective state “would more resemble the organisation of 
the Little Entente [the alliance between Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Romania] after 
the latest pact [January 1933] than a federation, even such as Switzerland” – in fact, he 
conceived of a loose association of fully independent states (Boban, 1971, 180–209). 
On the other hand, Maček maintained an ambivalent attitude that would allow him to 
move in diﬀ erent directions depending on the given situation: he publically espoused 
the solution of the Croat question within the framework of Yugoslavia, but he privately 
assured the Italians that his true goal was an independent Croatia (Sadkovich, 1988, 59; 
Boban, 1965b, 50–56).
Apart from the CPP’s passive resistance, the most extreme elements of the Croat 
political right formed the Ustaša revolutionary organisation under Ante Pavelić, the future 
infamous Führer (Poglavnik) of the Nazi-puppet Independent State of Croatia during 
World War Two. The Ustaša organisation was imbued with the racist anti-Serb ideology 
and wanted nothing short of a sovereign Greater Croatia. It was only natural that Pavelić 
and his most ardent followers found refuge in Italy which had been inimical to Yugoslavia 
since her creation. The Italians hankered after the dissolution of Yugoslavia for they had 
designs on the littoral province of Dalmatia and generally perceived a South Slav state as 
a thorn in their ﬂ esh – supported by France it thwarted Mussolini’s ambitions to establish 
predominant Italian inﬂ uence in the Danube region and in the Balkans. Propped up by 
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logistics from Rome, Fascist protégés, the Ustašas, were conducting a terrorist campaign 
in Yugoslavia from their bases in Italy ‒ and also from Hungary. One of the more striking 
examples of their activities was the abortive attempt to instigate a rebellion in the province 
of Lika (Stojkov, 1970). Their greatest success was no doubt the assassination of King 
Aleksandar in Marseilles in October 1934. The unrest in Croatia, the Ustaša terrorist 
campaign and the connivance of the Italian and Hungarian authorities lent the Croatian 
question an international dimension. 
It was not just the Ustaša movement, but also the CPP that actively sought foreign 
support in their struggle against the Yugoslav government. In October–December 1928, 
prior to the proclamation of King Aleksandar’s personal regime, Ante Trumbić paid 
visit to Paris and London on behalf of the CPP with a view to promoting the Croat cause 
and sounding the French and British oﬃ  cials as to their attitude towards the internal 
conﬂ ict in Yugoslavia. His mission was a dismal failure. The Secretary-General of the 
Quai d’Orsay, Philip Berthelot, advised him to seek for an agreement directly with King 
Aleksandar, while the Foreign Oﬃ  ce remained completely aloof (Krizman, 1962). In 
mid-1929, two prominent members of the CPP, Josip Krnjević and August Košutić, 
went abroad to mobilise public opinion and win over oﬃ  cials with whom they might get 
in touch for the Croat cause (Boban, 1965b, 69). It should be noted that the CPP closely 
cooperated in their activities with the pro-Habsburg ex-Austrian group of oﬃ  cers in 
Vienna led by General Stjepan Sarkotić and with the Ustaša. Maček’s envoy Košutić 
and Ante Pavelić together presented the Italians with an elaborate plan for an armed 
rebellion in Croatia in October 1929 (Sadkovich, 1988, 57). On his return from Karlové 
Vary where he had received medical treatment in October 1930, Maček had a meeting 
in Salzburg with his emigrant party colleagues and the Ustaša leader. On that occasion, 
they assigned a country to each participant as their respective ﬁ eld of propaganda work: 
“Pavelić conducts policy with the Italians, [August] Košutić [travels] between Italy and 
England, [Juraj] Krnjević sticks with the English and [Ljudevit] Kežman acts legally 
and is in touch with the French.” (Boban, 1965b, 78). The co-operation between the CPP 
and the Ustaša somewhat similar to that of the Sinn Féin and the Irish Republican Army 
made it more diﬃ  cult for the Belgrade government to deal with security challenges; 
both the Yugoslav and the Italian government viewed the two Croat organisations as 
two factions of a single movement striving for the same goal rather than two distinct 
groups (Sadkovich, 1988, 57–58).
PRINCE REGENT, STOJADINOVIĆ AND THEIR VIEW OF THE CROAT PROBLEM
It was in the diﬃ  cult circumstances following the murder of King and the demission 
of the short-lived Jevtić government formed after the 5 May 1935 elections that 
Stojadinović became Prime Minister and Foreign Minister in June that year. He was a 
friend and conﬁ dant of Prince Paul, King Aleksandar’s ﬁ rst cousin, who assumed regency 
until the 11-year-old King Petar II had not come of age. From the outset, the two men 
embarked on an all-round policy of appeasement both in domestic and foreign aﬀ airs. 
To form a basis for his government, Stojadinović decided to found a new party – the 
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Yugoslav Radical Union (Jugoslovenska radikalna zajednica – JRZ) (Tešić, 1997). It was 
a typical governmental party like that of his predecessor Jevtić, but it diﬀ ered insofar as 
it included the Slovene People Party headed by Anton Korošec and the Yugoslav Muslim 
Organisation led by Mehmed Spaho which truly represented the majority of the Slovenes 
and Bosnian Muslims. Being a prominent member of the oldest Serbian – Radical – party, 
Stojadinović himself stood for the Serbs, although his legitimacy was very dubious, to say 
the least. Signiﬁ cantly, the strong representation of the Slovenes and Bosnian Muslims in 
the JRZ and Stojadinović’s Cabinet isolated the Croats and strengthened the government 
in dealing with Maček’s party. From Stojadinović’s perspective, this could either make 
Maček more conciliatory and eventually bring him into the fold or keep him in an inferior 
position if he proved intransigent. 
The Prime Minister’s intention was to make a gradual shift from the late King’s 
policy which would allow the internal situation to settle down. Stojadinović, Korošec and 
Spaho recognised that the 5 May elections had failed to tranquilise the country and had 
produced the government devoid of any real authority due to the elections methods used 
by Jevtić. They called for the formation of a government that would be supported in all 
parts of the country and invited the Croat leader to enter their Cabinet. New elections under 
more democratic election law were also promised. Another indication that Stojadinović 
was willing to compromise was his apparent abandonment of the concept of integral 
Yugoslavism: he spoke of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes rather than of the Yugoslavs, 
albeit without qualifying them as separate nations.1 Moreover, he hinted at broad local 
self-government, with a view to appeasing regional and historical particularism, but 
without specifying its exact nature and extent.2 The Stojadinović government also allowed 
the outward expression of national identity such as the use of Croat ﬂ ag which had been 
banned under King Aleksandar’s personal regime. As a special sign of goodwill, Maček 
was released from prison in which he had been since April 1933, having been sentenced 
for treason. In addition, political rallies and activities of the opposition parties were revived 
through the more lenient application of the restrictive legislation. With all this in view, there 
were unmistakable signs that Stojadinović was preparing the ground for the restoration of 
democratic rights in the country and, along with that, an agreement with the Croats. 
But there was no basis on which such an agreement could be made, as the Crown 
and Prime Minister did not allow for the possibility of a federal state in order to satisfy 
the Croats. The well-informed British Minister in Belgrade, Sir Ronald Hugh Campbell, 
recorded the Regent’s opinion in this matter: “Apart from his determination not to modify 
the constitution by unconstitutional means during the King’s minority, Prince Paul 
remains convinced that the division of Yugoslavia, in its present state of development, 
into a number of autonomous federal units would lead to its early disruption.”3 To fend 
oﬀ  Maček’s demands, Prince Paul and his government refused any constitutional change 
1 AJ, 37-1-4, The Declaration of Stojadinović, Korošec and Spaho, undated but likely from June 1935, scans 
16–17. 
2 AJ, 37-1-4, Declaration of Stojadinović’s Cabinet, 4 July 1935, scans 31–33.
3 TNA FO 371/21197 R 7514/175/92, Campbell to Eden, 8 November 1937.
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under the Regency that would prejudice the rights of the underage King. But this was just 
a convenient excuse: Prince Paul had it on the authority of four leading law professors in 
the country that the Regency was not constrained in the exercise of royal powers and could 
even revise the constitution for the purpose of changing the state structure.4 Prince Paul’s 
view chimed with that of Stojadinović, who was also reported to have said repeatedly that 
the Croat question “could not be settled by a stroke of the pen and would in fact only be 
settled by the passage of time.” He intended to make headway by “the progressive grant 
of autonomous measures,” but Maček was not forthcoming and he came to the conclusion 
that no agreement could be reached.5 
As will be seen later, Stojadinović decided to proceed with a diﬀ erent approach to 
the Croat opposition to which his foreign policy was instrumental. But negotiations 
with Maček were carried on and, at least, served the useful purpose of improving the 
atmosphere in the country. It was Prince Paul rather than Stojadinović who cultivated 
initial contacts with the Croat leader. This was agreed between the two of them as they 
thought that Prince Paul would impress Maček with his title, appearance and demeanour. 
“In fact, he [Prince Paul] was supposed to keep Maček ‘under control’ for the time being, 
so that he would not do anything stupid, until things in the country got a little more 
settled and the time came for more serious political conversations with him, which I was 
supposed to conduct as Prime Minister and the leader of the largest political party,” 
Stojadinović explained in his memoirs (Stojadinović, 1963, 513).
NEGOTIATIONS WITH MAČEK AND STOJADINOVIĆ’S FOREIGN POLICY
Maček was granted an audience with Prince Paul on 8 November 1936 and had the 
opportunity to elaborate on his views. This meeting was followed up. Stojadinović made 
contact with Maček though the intermediary of Ljubomir Pantić, General Secretary of 
the JRZ and Stjepan Krasnik, the president of the Chamber for Trade and Industry in 
Zagreb. Another channel of communication was an exchange of views between Dragiša 
Cvetković, his Minister for Social Policy, and Ivo Pernar, Maček’s lieutenant. To 
demonstrate his goodwill, Stojadinović made sure that the 1936 municipal elections in 
the Savska and Primorska banovina, the two (out of nine) administrative units comprised 
of the Croat lands, were conducted orderly. Cvetković went to Zagreb to sound out the 
Croat position and reported optimistically that Maček would be moderate in his demands 
(Boban, 1970a, 194). However, Stojadinović did not expect much from this discussion 
as he was not prepared to consent to either revision of the constitution or federation – he 
later claimed to have received such instructions from the Regent (Jovanović Stoimirović, 
2000, 95–96; Stojadinović, 1963, 513–514). Finally, he met with Maček in the village 
of Brežice in January 1937. He made it clear that he could not contemplate a solution 
which would infringe on the constitution until King Petar had taken his throne. He also 
repeated his oﬀ er to the CPP to join his Cabinet and receive ﬁ ve ministerial posts, and, 
4 AJ, Prince Paul Papers, reel 2, Korošec to Antić, 16 January 1937, scans 483–497. 
5 TNA FO 371/21196 R 4041/125/92, Campbell to Eden, 4 June 1937.
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in doing so, contribute to passing of a new electoral law and conducting parliamentary 
elections. Maček declined. Stojadinović then proposed ‒ he later suggested it publically – 
that Maček should maintain his coalition with the Serbian United Opposition (Ujedinjena 
opozicija) and stand for their federalist program, whereas he would lead another grouping 
standing for a unitary state; the two large political blocs (resembling a two-party political 
scene in the USA and Great Britain) would face each other at the completely free elections 
in the fall of that year and proceed further depending on the outcome of such elections 
(Boban, 1970a, 195; Stojadinović, 1963, 516).6 This proposal appealed to Maček and 
Stojadinović promised to prepare the draft of a new electoral law and submit it to the 
Croat leader for his approval. The contact between them was maintained: Dragan Protić, 
head of Stojadinović’s oﬃ  ce, visited Maček twice over the next two months. The Croat 
leader was anxious to receive the promised draft, but he was met with excuses, since 
Stojadinović was still not prepared to call the elections (Boban, 1970a, 203–210).
Stojadinović’s great success, however, was in the ﬁ eld of foreign policy. He fully 
realised that Nazi Germany’s growing strength would lead to its predominance in Central 
Europe and constitute a principal factor in Belgrade’s conduct of external aﬀ airs. In 
the wake of the Abyssinian crisis and the German remilitarisation of the Rhinelend, it 
was clear that the Versailles settlement was crumbling down, spelling danger to all the 
successor states along the Danube. Yugoslavia was in an especially vulnerable position, 
bordering not just on her arch-enemy Italy but also on revisionist Hungary and Bulgaria, 
while her traditional links with France and Britain ‒ and her membership in the Little 
Entente and the Balkan Entente formed in 1934 together with Greece, Romania and 
Turkey ‒ did not provide suﬃ  cient guarantee for her security. With the rising Germany 
in sight, Yugoslavia had some room for manoeuvre, largely on account of the fact that, 
despite their increasingly close relations, Berlin and Rome pursued conﬂ icting interests 
in the region in which Belgrade was a cornerstone. Stojadinović was quick to seize his 
opportunity. In December 1935, the new Yugoslav Minister in Berlin, Aleksandar Cincar 
Marković, assured Hitler that Yugoslavia would not enter any political arrangements 
directed against Germany (Krizman, 1975, 84). This was not a diﬃ  cult promise to 
make as Yugoslavia was neither conterminous with Germany nor had any previous 
commitments that would pit her against that country. Appreciating Belgrade’s stance, 
Marshal Göring sent a message that Germany was willing to guarantee Yugoslavia against 
both Hungary and Italy, the importance of which Stojadinović stressed to Prince Regent. 
“For the sake of our tranquillity and securing the future of Yugoslavia, we must ﬁ nd an 
insurance against Italy as soon as possible,” he pointed out.7 Friendly relations with 
Berlin were also required on account of the increasing volume of trade between the two 
countries, which was partly a natural state of aﬀ airs due to geographic reasons and their 
complementary economies and partly resulted from the comprehensive German eﬀ ort to 
acquire political dominance in South-Eastern Europe. Finally, Yugoslavia was opposed 
6 For Stojadinović’s public reference to the electoral trial of strength between the unitarist and federalist party 
see AJ, 37-2-9, Stojadinović’s speech given to the JRZ youth on 24 October 1937. 
7 AJ, Prince Paul Papers, reel 4, Stojadinović to Prince Paul, 12 June 1936, scan 329. 
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to a possible Habsburg restoration in Austria, because she feared internal repercussions 
of such a development and the revival of revanchist ambitions more than she was weary 
of the Anschluss, which Stojadinović found inevitable in the long run (Biber, 1966a, 
129–130). After the Anschluss of Austria in March 1938, the German colossus emerged 
on the borders of Yugoslavia, which was an unpleasant geopolitical change in the position 
of that country. But Stojadinović could at least point out the foresight of his policy and 
calm down the public opinion with the unequivocal Hitler’s assurances with regard to 
the inviolability of Yugoslavia’s borders (Biber, 1966a, 138–139; Mićić, 2010, 82–108).
Stojadinović also managed to reach an agreement with Italy. In a sweeping diplomatic 
move, he signed a pact of friendship with Count Galeazzo Ciano, Italian Foreign Minister, 
in Belgrade on 25 March 1937. The Italians were anxious that Germany might swallow 
Austria and then channel its growing power in the direction of the Adriatic Sea, and 
thus sought to strengthen their position by establishing close relations with Belgrade. 
Apart from providing a reinsurance against Germany, Ciano was convinced that the 
Pact of Belgrade oﬀ ered the opportunity to achieve the long-standing Italian objective 
of wresting Yugoslavia away from France’s sphere of inﬂ uence and disrupting the Little 
Entente. (Knox, 1982, 35–36; Burgwyn, 1997, 155–156; Strang, 2003, 76–79; Bucarelli, 
2000, 467–509; Bucarelli, 2006, 327–383). In the circumstances, Stojadinović was able 
to obtain considerable beneﬁ ts for his country: Italy dropped its support for the Hungarian 
and Bulgarian revisionism, promised to improve the status of the Yugoslav (Slovene) 
national minority and renounced its patronage over the Ustaša organisation ‒ Pavelić 
and his supporters were even interned on the Eolian (or Lipari) island, in Sardinia and 
elsewhere in southern Italy (Avramovski, 1968, 261–317; Hoptner, 1956). The main 
stumbling block between the two countries for the last decade at least, namely Italy’s 
eﬀ ective protectorate over Albania, a country placed at Yugoslavia’s ﬂ ank, lay dormant. 
With his skilful diplomacy, Stojadinović defused a potential threat to Yugoslavia from the 
Axis partners, not to speak of the minor powers such as Hungary and Bulgaria. 
Although Stojadinović’s foreign policy was pursued in full agreement with and subject 
to the approval of Prince Paul, it bore the mark of dynamism and personal charisma of 
the Yugoslav premier. He was a frequent visitor in the capitals of the Great Powers ‒ for 
example he met face to face with Ciano four times ‒ and made a strong impression on 
his interlocutors. Stojadinović’s policy was much facilitated by his personal rapport with 
the leading ﬁ gures in Germany and Italy such as Göring and Ciano. The latter praised 
his qualities in his famous diaries and had much personal sympathy for Stojadinović; in 
addition, he believed that the Yugoslav premier was inclined to fascism, which appealed 
to the ideological aﬃ  nities of Italian foreign policy (Ciano, 1948, 98–105; Ciano, 2002, 
32–33). Stojadinović’s standing in Rome and the understanding he established with the 
Germans were seen in Hungary as a major obstacle to their own policy of breaking the 
Little Entente ring. After having failed to obtain Italy’s military guarantee against an 
unprovoked Yugoslav attack, Kalman Kanya, the Hungarian Foreign Minister, bitterly 
complained to Ciano: “Hungary’s misfortune is that Ciano and Göring have fallen in 
love with Stoyadinovich.” (Ciano, 2002, 110). This was certainly the whining bred out 
of disappointment, but it was not entirely amiss: Ciano ‒ and Mussolini, to lesser extent 
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‒ put a higher premium on the friendship of Yugoslavia than that of Hungary in their 
long-term plans for the Balkans and Central Europe (Ciano, 2002, 138–139).
Despite Ciano’s impressions, however, Stojadinović was not inspired by fascist 
leanings, or any other ideological sympathies. As a recent study has suggested, he was not 
an ideologue, but rather a shrewd practitioner of realpolitik; if he exhibited authoritarian 
tendencies while dealing with Ciano, this largely served a practical purpose to impress 
and cement their cordial relations (Djokić, 2011). Far from being a fortuitous improviser, 
Stojadinović had strong views on foreign policy and a clear strategy to steer Yugoslavia’s 
course in a hostile international environment. Firstly, he appreciated that Germany’s rise 
would bring about far-reaching consequences in Europe, that Austria and Czechoslovakia 
would fall victim to Hitler and that France and Great Britain would do nothing eﬀ ective 
to prevent such a development. Secondly, he was convinced that his country had to stay 
away from the Great Powers’ trial of strength and focus on the Balkans where it was 
something of a regional power (Ciano, 2002, 140–141). That was a diﬃ  cult undertaking, 
but Stojadinović believed, as early as mid-1937, that “in case of war, we have to try to 
remain neutral until the last moment and to preserve strength until after the war, so that we 
could dictate our demands to the weakened world.” In order to do so, he found it necessary 
to keep in balance relations with all powers. “Our eventual opponents in the ﬁ rst future 
war are Germany or Italy. […] We cannot aﬀ ord ourselves today the luxury of someone’s 
enmity. We have to weigh carefully our every word. And what is cardinal and fundamental, 
we must not declare ourselves in a future war before Italy [has done so]” (Jovanović 
Stoimirović, 2000, 132–138). It should be noted that Stojadinović did not believe in the 
“cordiality of Italo-German cooperation” and hence did not imagine the possibility of 
Yugoslavia’s being forced to wage war against both Axis Powers. He was not alone in this 
misapprehension; in fact, many a European diplomat shared his views. But it is signiﬁ cant 
that Stojadinović continued to perceive Italy as Yugoslavia’s main potential enemy even 
after the conclusion of the Pact of Belgrade ‒ incidentally, this is a proof that his view of 
that country was not tinged with the alleged fascist propensities. Likewise, Stojadinović 
was alive to the danger of the growing German economic hold on Yugoslavia and he tried 
to counter it by intensifying trade with France and Britain, including the purchases of 
military equipment. His economic expert Milivoje Pilja toured Paris and London in futile 
eﬀ orts to arrange for the increased trade with a view to preventing a virtual economic 
and political monopoly of Germany over Yugoslavia (Kaiser, 1980, 178–179). It was 
the failure of Western democracies to meet him halfway, because of their inability and 
unwillingness to depart from economic orthodoxy and counter the Germans with their 
own methods, and provide an alternative outlet for Yugoslavia’s products ‒ and those 
from other countries in the region ‒ that brought Stojadinović’s attempts to nothing.
Although Stojadinović’s ﬂ irtation with the Axis Powers stemmed from the requirements 
of Yugoslavia’s delicate geopolitical position and reﬂ ected her true interests, it was rather 
distasteful to Belgrade’s old friends. Fearful of the threat Germany posed to them, France 
and Czechoslovakia wanted to see the tightened Little Entente transformed from an anti-
Hungarian into an anti-German alliance and Yugoslavia’s policy ran contrary to their 
agenda. It was no surprise then that these two countries took a dim view of Stojadinović’s 
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handling of foreign aﬀ airs and went as far as intriguing with the opposition in Belgrade to 
have him removed from power (Stojkov, 1979; Vinaver, 1985, 367, 369–370). The British 
Foreign Oﬃ  ce also entertained some suspicions, especially after the Pact of Belgrade, 
that Prince Paul and Stojadinović were drifting into the Axis camp, despite the fact that 
the Regent was a pronounced Anglophile. Such fears especially peaked during the time 
of Stojadinović’s visit to Rome in December 1937 which was suspected of being a further 
step in his sliding towards the Axis. “We are being double crossed, & taking a long time 
to perceive the fact,” Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, declared, despite Campbell’s 
assurance to the contrary.8 Nevertheless, the British were not willing to lend their support 
to surreptitious French attempts to undermine the Yugoslav premier, since they saw no 
viable alternative to his regime.9 Following the Anschluss, Stojadinović underscored 
Yugoslavia’s diﬃ  culties in the newly-created situation and assured Campbell that he would 
follow the policy of His Majesty’s Government.10 The Foreign Oﬃ  ce came to appreciate 
the adroitness with which he managed Yugoslavia’s aﬀ airs and took a favourable view of 
the prospect of his staying in oﬃ  ce ‒ shortly before his downfall.11 For all their doubts 
and diplomatic lecturing in Belgrade, the British provided a measure of support to Prince 
Paul and his head of government.
THE IMPACT OF STOJADINOVIĆ’S FOREIGN POLICY 
ON THE CROAT QUESTION
As has been seen from this brief review, the requirements of realpolitik were certainly 
suﬃ  cient to determine the course of Stojadinović’s foreign policy. But the requirements of 
internal policy, namely the Croat question as the most pressing problem for consolidation 
of Yugoslavia, also considerably contributed to his conduct of foreign aﬀ airs. Once he 
concluded that an agreement with Maček could not be reached within the framework 
of a unitary state, Stojadinović decided to bring the Croat leader to heel by means of a 
political war of attrition. He embarked on a policy that would isolate the CPP both within 
and outside Yugoslavia. Internally, he had already won over the main political parties of 
the Slovenes and Bosnian Moslems to his JRZ and the government, depriving Maček 
of potentially valuable allies in his struggle for federal restructuring of Yugoslavia. 
In addition, Stojadinović tried to foment an opposition to the CPP among the Croats 
themselves with a view to splitting their monolith national movement. For that purpose, 
he sought to promote, albeit in a rather circumspect manner, the rise of dissidents from 
Maček’s party, including the son of Stjepan Radić, but his eﬀ orts in this respect remained 
8 TNA FO 371/21199 R 8392/224/92, Minute by Eden, 21 December 1937; Biber, 1976; Biber, 1983; 
Avramovski, 1986, 305–705.
9 TNA FO 371/21197 R 6319/175/92, Eden to Foreign Oﬃ  ce, 20 September 1937; R 6432/175/92, minutes 
by Sargent, 29 September 19137, and Vansittart, 30 September 1937, and Sargent to Phipps, 7 October 
1937; R 6519/175/92, minute by Vansittart, 9 October 1937.
10 TNA FO 371/22475 R 5481/147/92, Campbell to Foreign Oﬃ  ce, 3 June 1938.
11 TNA FO 371/22477 R 9778/234/92, Minutes by Brown and Noble, 12 December 1938, and Nichols, 15 
December 1938. 
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futile.12 However, in a volatile international situation during the latter half of the 1930s, 
the real danger was that the CPP could ﬁ nd a powerful support from beyond Yugoslavia’s 
borders. Italy’s and Hungary’s backing for the Ustaša movement had already created 
great diﬃ  culties and had been responsible for the assassination of King Aleksandar; but 
if the CPP, a political organisation in which the vast majority of Croats closed their ranks, 
had equally become an instrument of foreign disruption, and especially if Germany had 
interfered with the Serbo-Croat diﬀ erences, Yugoslavia would have faced a crisis on a 
much larger scale. Stojadinović perfectly understood this and acted accordingly.
As he early established good relations with Berlin, building on the growing economic 
exchange, Stojadinović made a point of making German treatment of Ustaša émigrés in 
that country a test of its loyal cooperation. Although most of Ustašas were sheltered in 
Italy, a group of them, in which the most prominent member was Branimir Jelić, settled 
in Germany. Stojadinović seized on Göring's oﬀ er to act as a protector of Yugoslavia 
during the delicate negotiations with Rome that led to the Pact of Belgrade and tried to 
exploit it in the matter of Jelić. He instructed Cincar-Marković to inform Göring “that we 
have reports that Pavelić has been out of Italy, that he keeps in contact with Jelić and that 
they are apparently preparing another attentat, perhaps on the life of His Majesty Prince 
[Paul] when he travels to London. The aim of your statement is: 1) to show the insincerity 
of the Italians at the moment when we negotiate with them, and 2) to ask for Jelić’s 
extradition, because he is increasingly becoming a very dangerous terrorist leader.”13 
A month later, Cincar-Marković reported that Göring had ordered that the émigrés be 
moved from Munich to northern Germany and interned, although he procrastinated 
with the extradition of Jelić ‒ his internment and that of his comrades had been carried 
out by early May 1937.14 After the Anschluss, the German Reich became a neighbour 
of Yugoslavia and its potential to inﬂ uence internal developments in that country was 
considerably greater. Stojadinović formed the impression from his discussion with 
Maček’s intermediary “that the Croats are scared of Germany and that, in their fear, they 
feel that only the Serbs can save them.”15 This was not an unreasonable assumption given 
that the Croat areas, along with the Slovene ones, were closer to Germany than those 
of the Serbs. However, Maček seems to have thought otherwise. His emissary went to 
Vilhelmstrasse to seek for German support for an independent Croatia, but the Germans 
immediately relayed the whole matter to Belgrade.16 This mistake on the part of the 
Croat leader clearly demonstrated that the Germans, just like the Italians, were intent on 
working with Belgrade and not with Zagreb, and it fully vindicated Stojadinović’s foreign 
policy in terms of its eﬀ ect on internal situation in Yugoslavia. 
12 AJ Prince Paul Papers, reel 4, Stojadinović to Prince Paul, 14 July 1938, scans 478–480; Stojadinović to 
Prince Paul, 30 August 1938, scan 501; AJ, 37-10-59, Report by Niko Novaković, scans 263–299; AJ, 37-
19-138, Report by Dr. Vorkapić, 25 Novembar 1937, scan 136. 
13 AJ, 37-30-221, Stojadinović to Cincar-Marković, 27 February 1937, scan 632.
14 AJ, 37-30-221, Cincar-Marković to Stojadinović, 25 March 1937, scans 633–638; also AJ, 37-62-378, 
Aćimović to Stojadinović, 4 May 1937, scans 34–37; Biber, 1962. 
15 AJ, Prince Paul Papers, reel 4, Stojadinović to Prince Paul, 13 October 1938, scans 563–567. 
16 TNA FO 371/22476 R 5193/234/92, Campbell to Halifax, 23 May 1938.
218
ACTA HISTRIAE • 26 • 2018 • 1
Dragan BAKIĆ: MILAN STOJADINOVIĆ, THE CROAT QUESTION AND THE INTERNATIONAL POSITION ..., 207–228
As has been seen, with the conclusion of the Pact of Belgrade, Italy assumed the 
obligation to clamp down on the terrorist and political activities of Ustašas in its territory. 
But the sudden rapprochment between the Adriatic neighbours also made a strong 
impression in Croatia. “In connection with the arrival of Count Ciano and the signature of 
the Yugo-Italian treaty, there is a depression and confusion, to a large degree, among the 
ranks of Dr. Maček’s supporters. In this respect, many prominent political people sharply 
criticise the policy of Dr. Maček in intimate conversations, which is barren and outdated 
and almost always based on the erroneous calculations and assumptions” (Boban, 1974, 
I, 411). The greatest confusion, however, was among the frankovci, who were practically 
a political wing of the Ustaša movement and who regarded Italy as having sold the Croats 
out to Belgrade. This appreciation was not far oﬀ  the mark. While sending oﬀ  Hitler 
from the railway station on the occasion of the latter’s visit to Rome, Mussolini told the 
Yugoslav Minister in Rome, Boško Hristić, that “the Croats cannot do anything now.”17 
This equally applied to Ustašas and the CPP. Stojadinović must have been pleased with 
himself upon reading Hristić’s letter. But the Yugoslav premier went even further in order 
to exploit the favourable opportunity presented to him to keep under control and ultimately 
disintegrate Pavelić’s movement in Italy. In agreement with the Italians, he sent to Rome 
Vladeta Milićević of the Ministry for Internal Aﬀ airs with the special mission to oversee 
the interment of Pavelić and his supporters. Moreover, Stojadinović decided to capitalise 
on the despondence of Ustaša émigrés with their position in the newly-created situation 
and allow them to come back to Yugoslavia, save the most notorious criminals. Central 
to this was the return of Mile Budak, one of the most prominent leaders of the Ustaša, 
with whom Stojadinović even personally met during his visit to Italy in June 1938 ‒ the 
former arrived in Zagreb next month (Boban, 1970b; Krizman, 1978, 301–313; Jonjić 
& Matković, 2008). As Stojadinović explained to Prince Paul, Budak’s return was 
designed to deal “a heavy blow” to Pavelić’s supporters.18 Indeed, a large number of Croat 
émigrés was allowed back to Yugoslavia and the Ustaša organisation was, at least during 
Stojadinović’s premiership, rendered rather impotent.
Since Stojadinović’s relations with the Axis Powers ensured that the CPP would not 
ﬁ nd a sympathetic ear in Berlin and Rome, Maček was forced to look for support in 
Britain and France, especially since he professed his democratic convictions. His main 
emissary to these countries was Krnjević, Secretary-General of the CPP, who had been in 
emigration since after the introduction of King’s personal regime in Yugoslavia, mainly 
staying at Geneva where he endeavoured to internationalise the Croat question through 
the League of Nations. However, Krnjević could not establish contact with the Foreign 
Oﬃ  ce, despite the intercessions on his behalf of the prominent public ﬁ gures such as 
the Duchess of Atholl and an English journalist Wickham Steed. Whitehall was weary 
of allowing him to cause diﬃ  culties in its oﬃ  cial relations with Belgrade and deplored 
even the prospect of Krnjević’s making propaganda in Britain against the Yugoslav 
17 AJ, 37-30-217, Hristić to Stojadinović, 29 May 1938, scans 284–285.
18 AJ, Prince Paul Papers, reel 4, Stojadinović to Prince Paul, 24 June 1938, scans 445–450. 
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government.19 Stojadinović was thus entirely justiﬁ ed when, after receiving a report to 
the eﬀ ect that the CPP placed much conﬁ dence in the eventual British diplomatic advice 
to Prince Paul, he scorned the idea.20 At Geneva, the Yugoslav delegate to the League 
of Nations, Ivan Subbotić, claimed that Krnjević was practically “imperceptible, i.e. no 
activity of his is felt here nor he has special access anywhere.”21 It was only in Paris that 
Maček’s lieutenant could ﬁ nd a receptive audience on account of the utter dissatisfaction 
there with Stojadinović’s foreign policy, but his lobbying in France was of no practical 
value, just as anywhere else. Nevertheless, during his conversation with the new French 
Foreign Minister, Georges Bonnet, an advocate of appeasement of Germany and thus 
sympathetic to the Yugoslav premier, Subbotić pointed out the negative attitude in France 
towards Stojadinović, as well as Krnjević’s contacts with French parliamentarians and the 
encouragement given to Maček.22 In short, Krnjević did not have much to show for all his 
sojourns in Western Europe.
In September 1938, the dramatic events in Czechoslovakia culminating during 
the Munich conference that led to Hitler’s annexation of the German areas of that 
country provided an apparent justiﬁ cation for Stojadinović’s policy. A successor state 
that sprang from the peace settlement in Paris, was riddled with nationalities conﬂ ict 
and dismembered along ethnic lines through an orchestrated combination of foreign 
interference and domestic subversion was a pattern to which Yugoslavia could ﬁ t all too 
easily. It was not without a touch of irony that Stojadinović aluded to the failure of Lord 
Runciman’s mediating mission between the Czechoslovak government and the Sudeten 
Germans when he spoke with the First Secretary of the British Legation. “He did not wish 
a situation to arise in which Lord Runciman might have to visit Belgrade in circumstances 
similar to those in which he had gone to Prague.”23 The Prime Minister referred to the 
German minority in Yugoslavia, but it did not take much imagination to conceive of the 
Croat problem in similar terms. Stojadinović’s diplomacy seems to have made Yugoslavia 
safe from such a disruption, despite the criticism of both the Serbian and Croat opposition 
that he sided with the Axis against the democratic countries. In the existing international 
situation, the CPP was deprived of external backing with which it could bring pressure to 
bear on the Yugoslav government or embark on some sort of illegal and violent separatist 
campaign. “Since Maček cannot count on the assistance of Italy and Germany, we do not 
believe in some revolutionary action. Eventual winking on the part of Pest does not seem 
dangerous, because the Hungarians are unpopular in Croatia,” Stojadinović assured 
Prince Paul.24 
In fact, Stojadinović was so convinced in the salutary eﬀ ect of his dexterous foreign 
policy on the electorate that he called for elections on 10 October 1938, something he had 
19 TNA FO 371/22476 R 3657/234/92, Minutes by Ross and Ingram, 31 March 1938, and Sargent, 1 April 
1937; Halifax to Duchess of Atholl, 4 April 1938.
20 AJ, 37-46-299, Stojadinović to Korošec, 17 May 1938, scan 741.
21 AJ, 37-31-233, Subbotić to Stojadinović, 7 May 1938, scans 720–721. 
22 AJ, 37-31-233, Subbotić to Stojadinović, 16 May 1938, scans 724–726. 
23 TNA FO 371/22378 R 7457/178/21, Shone to Foreign Oﬃ  ce, 2 September 1938.
24 AJ, Prince Paul Papers, reel 4, Stojadinović to Prince Paul, 7 October 1938, scans 554–559. 
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been angling for some time. The main contenders in the elections held on 11 December 
were the JRZ led by Stojadinović and the coalition consisting of the CPP and the Serbian 
opposition parties headed by Maček, which was essentially a clash between two large 
blocs, the centralists and federalists, just as the premier had long advocated. In his 
vigorous election campaign, Stojadinović stressed, along with his considerable success 
in economic policy, the security he provided for Yugoslavia amidst the grave European 
crisis (Lažetić, 1989; Simić, 2007, 250). The results were, however, a mixed blessing 
for Stojadinović: his list won around 300,000 votes more than that of Maček, which 
translated into an overwhelming majority in the parliament due to election rules, but it fell 
short of his expectations (Opra, 2001; Radojević, 1994a, 183–184). Ironically, instead of 
verifying Stojadinović’s political supremacy in Yugoslavia, the 1938 elections proved to 
be the beginning of his undoing.
STOJADINOVIĆ’S DOWNFALL
In view of the Yugoslav premier, the elections revealed the failure of his policy of 
appeasement in Croatia. In the wake of the elections, the reconstruction of Cabinet took 
place that saw Milan Aćimović, Stojadinović’s trusted supporter, replace the Slovene 
leader Korošec as the Minister for Interior Aﬀ airs. Aćimović was instructed to undertake 
the necessary measures to re-establish the authority of state in the Croat banovinas, 
seriously undermined by terror to which Maček’s supporters subjected their political 
opponents during the elections.25 Stojadinović apprised Prince Paul of his intention to 
tighten the reins on the Savska and Primorska banovina and added: “If an end is not put 
on this state of aﬀ airs quickly, I fear that we might experience unpleasant surprises.”26 
But there was nothing to change in the ﬁ eld of foreign policy. When Stojadinović advised 
Prince Paul to arrange for his visits to Rome and Berlin, following those to London 
and Paris that had taken place in 1938, he insisted that these diplomatic sojourns “were 
necessary both for our foreign and internal policy.”27 However, more pressing matter 
was Ciano’s visit to Yugoslavia in January 1939, which he undertook in order to sound 
out the Belgrade government as to potential partition of Albania ‒ no decision was made 
in this respect (Bakić, 2014, 602–612). During his tête-à-tête conversations with Ciano, 
Stojadinović did not seem to be concerned about the failure to come to terms with the 
Croats. Just as he had once told Campbell, he maintained the view that the Croat question 
could not be solved soon and invoked a historical parallel: “Only the years and the 
passing of generations will be able to modify a state of aﬀ airs which calls to mind the 
friction which long existed between Prussia and Bavaria, between North and South Italy” 
(Ciano, 1948, 267–272). 
On 4 February 1939, Stojadinović was, to his great surprise, removed from oﬃ  ce 
as a result of the carefully prepared plot which aligned against him the Slovene and 
25 AJ, 37-46-299, Aćimović to Stojadinović, 1 January 1939, scans 893–900. 
26 AJ, Prince Paul Papers, reel 4, Stojadinović to Prince Paul, 15 December 1938, scans 584–585.
27 AJ, Prince Paul Papers, reel 4, Stojadinović to Prince Paul, 21 January 1939, scans 527–530. 
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Bosnian Muslim members of his Cabinet together with Dragiša Cvetković, a Serb who 
replaced him as premier. More importantly, Prince Paul was behind this coup. The 
oﬃ  cial explanation for Stojadinović’s demission was that his presence in the government 
became an obstacle to reaching an agreement with the Croats. Nevertheless, Prince Paul’s 
intention to conciliate the Croats could not be equated with his decision to get rid of 
Stojadinović. It has long been claimed that it was a complex combination of internal 
and external factors, which could hardly be untangled, that accounted for Prince Paul’s 
dismissal of his premier (Biber, 1966b). To be true, Prince Paul made contact with Maček 
behind Stojadinović’s back through the agency of his Court Minister, Milan Antić, and 
Cvetković, who seized on the negotiations with the Croats as a means of furthering his 
own career.28 Maček insisted on the substance of his demands – a territorial autonomy for 
Croatia ‒ but he made a concession insofar as he agreed that the procedure would respect 
the provisions of the existing Constitution, a move clearly designed to save face to the 
Prince Regent. It is diﬃ  cult to believe that Prince Paul’s opinion as to the merits of a 
federal solution for Yugoslavia had undergone a substantial change. After having granted 
another audience to Maček as late as July 1938, he conﬁ ded to Campbell “that there were 
many moments during the course of this lengthy interview when he had had diﬃ  culty 
in keeping his temper as he had found the Croat leader was more narrow-minded and 
obstinate than ever.”29 
What then made Prince Regent persist in his negotiations with Maček and deprive 
himself of the services of his capable Prime Minister? There is considerable evidence 
that the Croat question was not the sole, and not even the most important, reason for the 
change in government. Prince Paul was rather reticent on the subject, but he did refer 
in retrospect to Stojadinović’s fascist inclinations (Djordjević, 1991, 114). His words 
must be taken as a crucial evidence in this matter. Indeed, he ordered Milan Aćimović, 
then Chief of the Belgrade police, to enquire into the allegations that Stojadinović was 
moulding the ruling party and the government on the pattern of a fascist dictatorship. 
He was also adamant in a conversation with his Chief of the General Stuﬀ  and the 
French Minister that he would never allow the Karadjordjević dynasty to suﬀ er the fate 
of the House of Savoy (Biber, 1966b, 37–50). Clearly, Prince Regent was fearful that 
Stojadinović might become Yugoslavia’s Mussolini. This initial impetus for Prince Paul’s 
break with Stojadinović then gave rise to other suspicions which seem to have ampliﬁ ed 
and underpinned each other. The Regent came to believe that Stojadinović was not just 
bent on imposing himself as a fascist leader of the JRZ, but that he was trying to further 
his plans by making clandestine deals with Ciano during the latter’s visit to Yugoslavia 
in early 1939. He even suspected Stojadinović of carrying out the most fantastic plot 
which involved the cession of the western non-Serb parts of Yugoslavia to Italy and the 
formation of Greater Serbia in which Stojadinović would be a fascist dictator and which 
would include the northern parts of Albania and Thessaloniki (Biber, 1966b, 16–19). 
28 AJ, Prince Paul Papers, reel 14, Antić to Prince Paul, 9 January 1939, scans 841-843; reel 15, Cvetković to 
Prince Paul, 2 February 1939, scans 812-813. 
29 TNA FO 371/22476 R 6426/234/92, Campbell to Halifax, 15 July 1938.
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Ciano’s visit and his conversations with Stojadinović appear to have been a catalyst for 
Prince Paul’s decision to remove the latter from oﬃ  ce. Antić, who was a conﬁ dant of 
the Regent and inimical to the Prime Minister, has asserted that the Ciano-Stojadinović 
talks remained secret for Prince Paul and presented “the last drop of poison in the 
relations between the Prince and Stojadinović.”30 The ﬁ rst assertion was groundless, as 
Stojadinović not just asked Prince Paul for an audience on 17 January in order to discuss 
Ciano’s impending visit, but also sent him a letter, detailing what had passed between him 
and the Italian.31 Ciano’s own records conﬁ rm that Stojadinović did nothing that could 
be construed as disloyal to either Prince Paul or his country. But the Regent made up his 
mind not to trust Stojadinović, however unfounded his suspicions were. Being in such 
frame of mind, Prince Paul hastened to engineer Stojadinović’s downfall and thus prevent 
both his alleged personal ambitions and the special arrangements he was suspected of 
having made with Italy.
EPILOGUE
With Cvetković as his new premier, Prince Paul made every eﬀ ort to maintain cordial 
relations with Berlin and Rome which, after all, had no alternative for Yugoslavia. 
Internally, Prince Paul was anxious to consolidate the country so that it could face the 
disturbing political situation in Europe with more strength and conﬁ dence. He decided 
to work together with Maček to that end and pay the price by satisfying the principal 
Croat demands. The outcome of Prince Paul’s new political course was the Cvetković-
Maček agreement (Sporazum) concluded on 26 August 1939 that resulted in the creation 
of Banovina Hrvatska, the Croatian province with an extensive autonomy (Boban, 
1965a). It should be noted, however, that Prince Paul yielded to Maček’s intransigence 
largely for reasons of the precarious international situation on the eve of the Second 
World War. A full discussion of the merits and implications of such an agreement is 
beyond the scope of this paper, but a few observations are of interest for the assessment 
of Stojadinović’s policy. Notwithstanding the general necessity to settle the Serbo-
Croat dispute and resolve the internal Yugoslav crisis, the 1939 agreement was heavily 
ﬂ awed from the Serb point of view. Firstly, if Stojadinović’s mandate to represent the 
Serbs might have been deemed contentious after the December elections, Cvetković’s 
legitimacy was virtually non-existent; the latter merely acted as a Prince Paul’s 
messenger and he was no match for Maček. The Crown thus assumed responsibility 
for the agreement on behalf of the Serbs and practically imposed it on the largest 
nation in Yugoslavia. Secondly, Prince Paul accepted what amounted to extortionist 
concessions to Maček – the territorial scope of the Croatian Banovina far exceeded 
that of the historic province of Croatia under the Habsburgs or, for that matter, today’s 
Croatia. This resulted from inconsistent application of ethnic criterion in the districts 
30 A SANU, 14387/8734, undated note; Hoptner, 1962, 126–127.
31 AJ, Prince Paul Papers, reel 4, Stojadinović to Prince Paul, 16 January 1939, scans 531–532; Stojadinović 
to Prince Paul, 20 January 1939 (from Belje), scans 534–541. 
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in which the Croats constituted the majority of population and historical principle in 
those in which the Serbs were the majority. Thirdly, Croatia was now something of a 
corpus separatum in Yugoslavia, whereas the Serbs and Slovenes ‒ although the latter 
were autonomous for all the practical purposes in their Drava banovina ‒ remained 
in an undeﬁ ned and uncertain position. Thus, the Serb question replaced that of the 
Croats. The future status of Bosnia and Herzegovina was a particularly sensitive issue, 
since the aspirations of Serbs and Croats in respect of this province were irreconcilable 
(Radojević, 1994b, 30–39). This meant that the Sporazum eﬀ ectively had an unfortunate 
eﬀ ect of prolonging the Serbo-Croat diﬀ erences instead of bringing them to an end by 
means of a deﬁ nite compromise solution.
Finally, Stojadinović’s fall undermined the conﬁ dence that Berlin and Rome, in 
particular, had in Yugoslavia’s policy and consequently Belgrade’s standing was 
weakened both in foreign and internal aﬀ airs. Maček was quick to exploit his opportunity 
and his emissaries started to pay visits to Ciano, oﬀ ering him cooperation and even 
personal union of Croatia with Italy. They were no longer ignored; in fact, they were put 
in contact with Pavelić and received pecuniary subsidies for their subversive activities 
(Boban, 1974, II, 108–118; Trifković, 1993, 537–542). On the other hand, Mussolini 
hesitated to endanger the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, because he feared that 
Germany might emerge as a champion of an independent Croatia and break out to the 
Adriatic (Ciano, 2002, 202–203, 221, 226). Despite German assurances to the eﬀ ect 
that Italian interests in this area would be preeminent, Mussolini and Ciano sent a cable 
to Belgrade “to inform the Regent, Paul, that we have called a halt to German action 
and also to advise him to hasten negotiations with Zagreb, because any waste of time 
might be fatal” (Ciano, 2002, 204–205). Italian apprehensions were, in fact, groundless. 
Although Maček’s people did go to Berlin and seek support for their separatist plans, 
the Germans refused to give them any encouragement in February and March 1939, as 
they were careful not to wound Mussolini’s susceptibilities (Boban, 1974, II, 80–82, 
84; Trifković, 1993, 537–538). 
It was Prince Paul now who felt more anxious than Maček to conclude an agreement 
due to Yugoslavia’s aggravated international situation ‒ and he paid for it dearly at 
the expense of the Serbs. To that extent, Stojadinović had a point when he criticised 
Prince Paul for frittering away the achievements of his own foreign policy. “By sticking 
with Germany,” he told his friend Aćimović, “it was not necessary … to make any 
concessions to the Croats … The friendship with the Germans … was suﬃ  cient to 
us Serbs to keep in check all our opponents in the Balkans, within and beyond the 
state borders” (Cvetković, 1958, 7; Jovanović Stoimirović, 2000, 259). These words 
aptly summed up the substance of his policy. Although there was no apparent change 
in Germany’s attitude towards Yugoslavia, the Italians reverted to their hostility to 
Belgrade. There is thus no doubt that the shaken conﬁ dence of the Axis Powers in 
Belgrade after the ouster of Stojadinović created better international conditions for 
Maček’s party and strengthened his hand in negotiating with Prince Paul. Out of oﬃ  ce, 
Stojadinović headed a group of 20 senators and 83 members of parliament in their 
opposition to Cvetković’s negotiations with Maček (Boban, 1965a, 180–185). After the 
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Sporazum, he founded a new political organisation, the Serbian Radical Party, which 
advocated the union of all the Serbs in a single federal unit within Yugoslavia, but he 
could not reverse or aﬀ ect the course of internal policy. Stojadinović’s political star was 
on the decline: he was interned and, ﬁ nally, handed to the British to take him away from 
Yugoslavia ‒ because he was a potential German favourite ‒ shortly before Yugoslavia 
was involved in the war in April 1941.
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MILAN STOJADINOVIĆ, HRVAŠKO VPRAŠANJE IN MEDNARODNI 
POLOŽAJ JUGOSLAVIJE, 1935–1939
Dragan BAKIĆ
Srbska akademija znanosti in umetnosti, Inštitut za balkanske študije, Knez Mihailova 35/IV, 
11000 Beograd, Srbija
e-mail: dragan.bakic@bi.sanu.ac.rs
POVZETEK
V članku je prikazana politika jugoslovanskega ministrskega predsednika in 
zunanjega ministra Milana Stojadinovića glede hrvaškega nezadovoljstva in opozicije do 
srbske vlade v Beogradu, s posebnim poudarkom na mednarodnih razmerah in zunanjih 
političnih posledicah. V sicer bogati literaturi o srbsko-hrvaškem sporu v obdobju med 
obema svetovnima vojnama je bilo o tem vprašanju posvečene bolj malo pozornosti. Za 
Stojadinovića sta bili zunanja in notranja politika neločljivo povezani, predvsem zaradi 
nevarne mednarodne situacije, ki jo je povzročila agresivnost Hitlerja in Mussolinija. 
Menil je, da je bilo vzdrževanje prijateljskih političnih odnosov z Nemčijo in Italijo 
ključnega pomena za sposobnost Jugoslavije v boju proti hrvaškemu separatizmu. V okviru 
take strategije ideološka vprašanja niso imela nobene teže, kljub pogosto ponavljajočim 
se obtožbam o Stojadinovićevih pro-fašističnih nagnjenjih. Stojadinović je bil odločen, da 
bo treba Hrvaško kmečko stranko, ki jo je vodil Vlatko Maček, prikrajšati in izolirati, in 
sicer s partnerstvom na jugoslovanski politični sceni s političnimi predstavniki Slovencev 
in bosanskih muslimanov. Dosegel je določene uspehe, dokler ga na niso na začetku 
leta 1939 odstavili – bil je to konec njegove politike zadrževanja Hrvatov, ko so se tudi 
postavili temelji glede rekonstrukcije Jugoslavije na federalni podlagi.
Ključne besede: Milan Stojadinović, Jugoslavija, hrvaško vprašanje, zunanja politika, 
1935–1939
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